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ABSTRACT 
 
The Red Scare of the late 1940s and 1950s was fueled by claims of governmental 
espionage from former members of the communist underground. Harry Dexter White, Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury was accused of being a Soviet agent of influence. This paper will 
analyze the current issues in the discussion of Soviet espionage and focus on White’s activities 
in this regard. The evidence on White is clear enough to show that he did pass sensitive 
information to the Soviets.  He also succeeded in subverting American policy to favor Soviet 
interests over U.S. interests. White’s activities in government service suggest that American 
government officials passed on vital government information to the Soviet Union and subversive 
activity went on  in the U.S. in the 1930s and 1940s. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1945, the FBI began a major investigation into Soviet espionage in the United States. 
In November of that year, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover sent the White House a memorandum 
naming more than a dozen prominent government officials known to have been actively giving 
information to or spying for the Soviet Union. Among those listed was Harry Dexter White, 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. 1945 was crucial because, at a time the FBI became 
interested in Communist activity, four highly placed and credible Communist sources 
volunteered information to the FBI in a six-month period.1
In March, the FBI requestioned Whittaker Chambers, a former courier for a Washington, 
D.C. based Soviet spy ring. Chambers had broken with the Communist Party USA (CPUSA) in 
1939. At that time he had met with Assistant Secretary of State Adolph A. Berle and journalist 
Isaac Don Levine to warn of high-level Soviet penetration of the State Department, Treasury De-
partment and the White House. Chambers’ main concern in coming forward was not espionage 
so much as these Soviet agents’ ability to influence U.S. policy to the advantage of the Kremlin.2
A former CPUSA leader, Louis Budenz, defected to the FBI in August. In September, 
Igor Gouzenko, a Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) code clerk stationed in Ottawa, Canada, 
defected as well. Gouzenko was a low-level code clerk. He spirited more than one hundred pages 
of documents out of the Soviet embassy in Ottawa. The documents proved extensive espionage 
work in Canada and the U.S., however, he was not able to identify agents and assets by name. He 
only knew them by their position in government. One of these was a highly placed person in the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury. The Canadians shared his revelations with the FBI. Finally, in 
November, Elizabeth Bentley turned herself in to the FBI and signed two lengthy statements 
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naming more than eighty people she claimed were Soviet agents. Bentley’s statements 
concerning White were that his most important contribution was his ability to place communists 
in government positions and to influence policy.3
In addition, in 1944 Katherine Perlo wrote President Roosevelt. The purpose of her letter 
was to warn him that her pro-communist husband was an active member of the Ware group. 
Harold Ware organized a group of like-minded government employees. Openly they discussed 
communist philosophy. Secretly they provided documents to the Soviets. Among the members of 
the group she would later name was White.4 Bentley, Chambers, Budenz, Gouzenko, and Perlo 
all implicated White as a spy either implicitly or explicitly. 
The FBI’s investigation and claims threatened the reputation of the Democratic adminis-
trations of Roosevelt and Truman. Over the next four years, the ensuing testimony in court and 
before the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC)5 became high drama with con-
siderable political consequences. Among the witnesses would be Chambers and Bentley. 
The accusations against White revolved around four incidents with which White was 
involved. First, he was the real architect of the Morgenthau plan to pastorialize Germany to 
punish her for starting two World Wars in thirty years. Second, he used his position in the 
Treasury Department to develop a hostile U.S. policy toward prewar Japan. The reason was to 
distract Japan from their plans to attack the Soviet Union and draw the U.S. into the war as an 
ally with the Soviet Union. Next, White delayed financial support to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-
shek’s Nationalist Chinese government causing the triumph of Mao Tse-Tung’s Communist 
Chinese government. Finally, he was instrumental in handing over the Allied Military mark 
printing plates to the Soviets. This caused a $250,000,000 deficit in the occupational government 
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budget paid out by the U.S. Treasury. His accusers claim all this was done at the behest of the 
Russians to the detriment of U.S. policy and national security. 
This thesis will examine these incidents and seek to determine whether Harry Dexter 
White’s actions are consistent with the accusations of espionage and being an agent of influence 
for the Soviet Union. White’s case is being considered for several reasons. White never stood 
trial like the Rosenbergs or Alger Hiss. Thus, he never acquired a vocal following of supporters 
declaring his innocence. As a result, his story does not carry the same emotional baggage as 
other suspected espionage cases. Consequently, White’s case has not been examined and 
reexamined as much as the Hiss and Rosenberg cases. It is still possible to present original 
analysis of his actions. Being less controversial, his supporters do not deny a limited 
involvement in espionage and his critics question, at times, his usefulness.  
The best primary materials are written in Russian and are archived in Moscow. Until re-
cently, scholars could see only the tip of the Soviet prewar espionage iceberg. With the fall of 
the Soviet Union, many new sources have become available to historians. First, source files of 
the KGB were opened to the public. In 1991, Boris Yeltsin seized the property of the Soviet 
Communist Party (CPSU) and opened its records to the public as well. Among these records are 
an almost complete set of correspondence between the CPUSA and their Moscow masters. The 
Kremlin has realized the sensitivity of these archives and has curtailed unrestricted access.6 Only 
a few writers have produced works based on their research into the original documents. Further, 
peer review of many supporting documents is difficult, if not impossible, at this time. In a like 
manner, the CIA classified the original Russian cables of the VENONA transcripts and they are 
unavailable to researchers. Thus, most of the current discussion and debate on the subject of 
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early Soviet espionage activity are historiographical. Therefore, concerning the Soviet archives 
and the VENONA messages, this paper will take an historiographical approach.  
Scholars hold much of this discussion in a rather new venue for historical discourse -- 
internet discussion forums. Before the advent of the internet, the time delay for a book or article 
to appear in print, reviews written and rebuttals offered would be months, if not years. The inter-
net can shorten this process to days or hours -- even minutes in some cases. This source, then, is 
used to examine the current discussion by those on both sides of the issues examined. Since 
several who argue in defense of those accused of espionage use the approach of an unbiased 
judge or defense attorney, this paper is organized as one might organize a courtroom trial. 
A word on some of the conventions used. Russia’s vast Soviet State Security 
organization had many names and acronyms. The most commonly known name was the KGB. 
To avoid con-fusion this is the name that is used, for the most part, throughout this paper. One 
exception will be its successor, the current Russian state police or the SVR. It is important to 
remember that the KGB is an intelligence organization separate from Soviet Military Intelligence 
or the GRU. This distinction will be crucial at times. Also, many people mentioned will be 
people with code names. These code names will appear in uppercase, such as BILL or JURIST, 
when used in VENONA decrypts, when we know no other name or when their aliases would 
have only been known to the people under discussion. In order to avoid undue confusion, when 
quoting VENONA decrypts or KGB documents, known names appear in italics instead of code 
names -- so “...circumstances would not allow them to leave CARTHAGE. ROBERT thinks that 
RICHARD would have...” becomes “...circumstances would not allow them to leave 
Washington, D.C.. Silvermaster thinks that White would have...” 
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THE ACCUSED: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 
HARRY DEXTER WHITE 
 
White’s biographers David Rees, Harry Dexter White: A Study in Paradox (New York, 
1973) and R. Bruce Craig, Treasonable Doubt: The Harry Dexter White Spy Case, (Lawrence, 
KS, 2004) take different approaches to White’s life. Rees focuses on describing and analyzing 
White’s economic accomplishments. Rees avoids the question of divided loyalties. He references 
the charges but chooses neither to accuse nor to defend White. Craig’s purpose for writing is to 
use the charges against White as a mechanism for examining the politics, society and judicial 
system during the New Deal era and the crisis of the early days of the Cold War. Craig comes to 
the conclusion that White was guilty of “as species of espionage” but chooses to weigh that 
against White’s motives.7
Harry Dexter White’s parents were Lithuanian Jews who migrated to the U.S. in 1885. 
Harry White was born on 9 October 1892.8 His father’s successful hardware business provided 
White a middle class rather than poor immigrant childhood. Like many other future New Dealers 
who came of age during the beginning of the twentieth century, White became active in the 
Progressive Movement. White began running a house for war orphans. In 1920 White became 
the executive director of The Corner House, a settlement house in New York City.9  
In 1922, Columbia University accepted White but he soon transferred to Stanford where 
he excelled in economics and received his Master’s degree in 1925. He then went to Harvard 
where he received his Ph.D. in 1932. White also studied Russian with the intent of gaining a 
fellowship to study economic planning in Russia. He moved to Washington, D.C. in 1933 and 
started his official career with the Department of the Treasury.10  
 
 6
Several characteristics led to White’s rapid rise in the Treasury Department in Washing-
ton. He could propose and explain difficult monetary policies to untrained decision-makers. 
White could forcefully and persuasively present his ideas even if he was, curt, abrasive and 
offensive at times. His Jewish heritage abetted his rise as well. Secretary of the Treasury Henry 
Morgenthau was only the second Jew to hold a cabinet position. White and Morgenthau shared a 
common faith, settlement experience in the Progressive Movement, and a hatred of Hitler’s 
National Socialism. These common bonds gave White special access to Morgenthau. Craig 
agrees with the FBI’s assessment of Henry Morgenthau’s diaries that White developed 
considerable influence with him.11
 In his early years in Treasury, White concentrated on the relationship that gold and silver 
had to currency management. He also became an expert on Japanese and Chinese monetary 
policy. One of his maxims was that free trade could prevent war. In 1935, he argued that the 
solution to Japan’s imperialism lay in the removal of trade barriers, explaining that, to the 
Japanese, trade restrictions made their imperialism an economic imperative. One of White’s 
ideas that brought him prominence was the creation of a Division of Research and Statistics in 
the Treasury Department. By 1936 he was the Assistant Director of this new department. Less 
than two years later Morgenthau appointed him the Directory of Monetary Research. About this 
time he joined Morgenthau‘s inner circle known as the “9:30 group.” Under White’s guidance, 
the Department of the Treasury’s international monetary policy became a major priority. Besides 
China and Japan’s policies, the Treasury watched the trade and gold policies of the future 
belligerents, Germany, Italy and Russia closely. After Pearl Harbor, Morgenthau gave White the 
responsibility to “take supervision over and assume full responsibility for Treasury’s 
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participation in all economic and financial matters...in connection with the operation of the Army 
and Navy and the civilian affairs in the foreign areas in which our armed forces are operating or 
are likely to operate.” Though he served as such, it was not until January of 1945 that 
Morgenthau appointed White Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.12  
Harry Dexter White also had a second life outside his Treasury duties. He had long-
standing contacts with the CPUSA. He was not a member but an independent source of informa-
tion. As early as 1935 he agreed to pass on Treasury documents for Whitaker Chambers to 
photograph and return. Later, White worked with a spy ring known as the “Silvermaster 
Group.”13  
Named for and run by economist Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, this loose assemblage of 
government officials included White. The rolls of film they shipped to Moscow show the extent 
and success of the group. In 1942 the Silvermaster Group delivered 59 rolls of film to their 
handler. In 1943, it was 211 rolls, 600 in 1944, and 1895 in 1945.14
It was the group’s very success that eventually resulted in its exposure. Controllers of the 
Silvermaster Group worried about Silvermaster’s unorthodox methods. Belief that this group 
would produce more intelligence if left unsupervised triumphed over security concerns. Silver-
master was an economist and an idealistic revolutionary but he was not a trained spy. Members 
either disdained trade craft or used it only for the drama it provided. They openly socialized with 
one another and talked about their clandestine affairs among themselves. Disillusioned by Soviet 
excesses Whittaker Chambers, courier for the ring, left the communist party in 1938 . Chambers’ 
replacement, Elizabeth Bentley, formed a romantic relationship with her Soviet contact. In 1945, 
Moscow attempted  to impose discipline, compartmentalize the operation, and provide security 
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for the group. These efforts raised Bentley’s suspicions and she then left. Because of the lack of 
discipline, when Chambers and Bentley talked to authorities they were able to reveal an unusual 
amount information about the groups’ operations, it members’ activities and White’s participa-
tion.15
In 1948, Both Bentley and Chambers testified before HUAC and publicly accused White 
of espionage and policy subversion. White demanded and received permission to appear before 
HUAC to clear his name. As Craig points out, most people saw his testimony as a success at the 
time. He had defended his innocence but Craig concludes that only his death three days later 
kept the public from realizing he had lied under oath.16
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THE ACCUSERS AND THEIR ACCUSATIONS 
In signed statements and under oath before the U.S. Congress, Whittaker Chambers and 
Elizabeth Bentley explained their activities as members and couriers for the Soviet underground. 
Both Bentley and Chambers accused Harry Dexter White of espionage and being a Soviet “agent 
of influence.” 
Their testimonies told similar, complimentary, stories. They mention a wide range of 
people and activities; but they are, often, the same people and similar activities. They gave their 
initial interviews with the FBI without knowledge of the other’s testimony. One cannot easily 
dismiss or overlook such independent corroboration.17 Except for Chambers’ “Pumpkin Papers,” 
both accounts rely on oral evidence. There are some contradictions, and in Bentley’s case, 
embellishments. The difficulty is to decide if the discrepancies are germane to the overall story 
or mere trivialities. Bruce Craig comes to the conclusion that while Chambers and Bentley may 
overstate their claims, they do hold up to tough scholarly scrutiny.18  
The description of White’s involvement in the Communist underground was an evolving 
process. Chambers said White was his least productive source while Bentley states he was one of 
her most important sources. In the interval between Chambers’ contact with the Silvermaster 
Group and Bentley’s work, White had risen within the Treasury Department. He now had more 
responsibility and authority with easy access to documents. Therefore, he could easily have been 
more important to Bentley than to Chambers. Chambers states that White was not in the party so 
Chambers could not give him orders only suggestions. Bentley says that she did not know if he 
had joined the CPUSA but “to all intents and purposes he was because he followed Party 
discipline.” Chambers also commented that White “was a Fellow Traveler so far in the fold that 
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his not being a Communist would be a mistake on both sides.” Additionally, he stated that White 
was very arrogant until Chambers inadvertently missed several meetings with White. White was 
more tractable after that because he hated feeling neglected by the CPUSA. Ideologically and 
emotionally it is not difficult to see White becoming more involved in the years between Cham-
bers and Bentley. Finally, in 1938 Chambers tried to scare White away from spying when he left 
the CPUSA and he felt like he had succeeded. Bentley’s testimony was that White had worked 
with Silvermaster in the 1930s but then quit abruptly. Sometime in the early 1940s, White said 
he was ready to participate again. Both used the term “timid” concerning White’s personality. 
Between the two of them they captured details that suggest a growing determination to be a part 
of the Communist Party and its activities -- legal and otherwise.19
In condensed form the accusations against White by these two former Communist 
couriers are as follows. Chambers states that White volunteered Treasury documents in the early 
1930s. When he began to meet with Chambers on a regular basis, they would drive around in 
White’s car while he would give Chambers oral reports and handwritten notes. Also, White was 
able to place other communists within the Treasury Department. In December of 1937, White 
was presented with a Turkish rug for his services to the Soviet people. Bentley’s charges against 
White were that he contributed documents through either George Silverman or monetary analyst 
Sonya Gold.20  Although he handed over information to the Soviets, his most important 
contribution to the group was his ability to influence policy, place communists in government 
positions, and protect them from investigations about their communist and sympathies. Once 
public investigations started, Bentley testified that White, on instructions, “pushed hard” for the 
Morgenthau Plan, was the driving force behind giving the Soviets printing plates for the German 
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Occupation currency, and played his part in helping overthrow Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s 
Nationalist Chinese government.21  
This thesis will address Bentley’s three charges at the appropriate time. However, 
Chambers’ story of the Turkish rugs needs examination. Around Christmas of 1936, PETER, 
Chambers’ handler, gave Chambers $1000 to buy presents for his sources. Chambers was against 
the idea because he said they were communists on principle and payment would offend them and 
PETER would lose their trust. PETER was insistent. It was a matter of control. PETER said that 
“who pays is boss, and who takes money must also give something.” Chambers then took the 
money and, as directed, purchased four expensive Turkish or Bokhara rugs as gifts. The four 
recipients were Alger Hiss, George Silverman, Julian Wadleigh and White.22
Chambers had the rugs delivered to Silverman’s house. Silverman kept one and gave 
another to White. Chambers then gave one to Hiss. Chambers could not remember how 
Wadleigh received his rug. PETER was correct and Chambers was wrong about the reaction to 
the gifts. White and Silverman were very pleased to receive tokens of the gratitude of the Soviet 
People.23
Once Chambers revealed the story of the rugs in open court, the recipients offered other 
accounts for them. All four admitted to being given the rugs. Silverman, though, denied it for a 
while until finally stating to a Grand Jury that Chambers gave him a rug. However, he then 
added that Chambers had given it to him as repayment for a debt Chambers owed him. Hiss also 
said his rug was “payment in kind” for some “back rent” Chambers owed him. This admission 
by Hiss contradicts his Grand Jury testimony on when he had contact with Chambers. White’s 
widow said the rug had been a gift from Silverman and not Chambers. Only Julian Wadleigh 
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confirmed Chambers’ story about the rugs testifying that it was “the only recompense he ever 
received for his underground work.” Silverman and Hiss would have reason to be less than 
truthful about the nature of the rugs. Mrs. White may have truly believed the source of the rug 
was Silverman but if she knew its true origin she might have still told the same story.24
In sum, Chambers account appears most credible. Bentley further bolsters his story. In 
one of her first depositions to the FBI, she stated that, according to Silvermaster, “the Russians 
used to give Harry [White] presents including a Persian rug.” Years after the rugs were 
presented, one of Bentley’s contacts who was a friend of White’s was in their home. On seeing 
the rug she said something to the effect of “Why, that looks like one of those Soviet rugs.” In the 
intervening silence White looked very nervous and when the friend returned to the house a 
month later, the rug was gone.25
Besides corroborating the other’s testimony, recent revelations by several former 
communists substantiate Chambers and Bentley’s accounts. John Abt, named by Chambers as a 
member of the Ware Group, has admitted that he was a secret Communist, and corroborated 
Chambers’ details concerning the Ware Group. Josephine Herbst’s biographer states that her 
husband, John Herrmann, had the important responsibility of courier for the Ware Group under 
Chambers. Hope Hale Davis has written her autobiography and confirms her role in the Commu-
nist underground. She, too, names many of the same people as Chambers and Katherine Perlo.26
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THE EVIDENCE 
Besides the testimony of Soviet and CPUSA defectors, new evidence of Soviet espionage 
and Harry Dexter White’s participation has recently emerged. In 1995 the CIA released to the 
public WWII Russian cable traffic between Moscow and the U.S.27  
With the outbreak of WWII in Europe, the U.S. Army Security Agency (ASA) began 
collecting copies of all cables entering and leaving the country. In the next four years they 
intercepted thousands of coded messages sent between Washington, D.C. and Moscow. In 1961, 
they named the messages and the whole decryption program VENONA.28 The real surprise in 
the decoding was the realization that they were not reading diplomatic traffic but intelligence 
briefings between the Kremlin and professional intelligence operatives in America.29
VENONA showed that the Soviet Union had dozens of well-placed agents in every major 
department of the Executive branch. The ASA briefed the White House about the information 
garnered by VENONA, but not the source or the nature of the source. 30 Among the identified 
people named in VENONA were Nathan Gregory Silvermaster as ROBERT and PAL,  and 
Harry Dexter White as RICHARD, JURIST and LAWYER.31  
VENONA decrypts were too sensitive for a public trial and would have had trouble 
surviving legal appeal. However, they did provide independent corroboration of the information 
provided by Communist defectors Gouzenko, Chambers and Bentley. 
Active work on VENONA ceased in October of 1980. VENONA remained classified, but 
leaks about the project started a few years later. References to VENONA were found in the 
newly opened Soviet archives and, as a result, the National Security Agency (NSA) and the CIA 
released the VENONA decrypts to the public.32
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VENONA validates many of Chambers’ and Bentley’s allegations. Examining all fifteen 
cables mentioning White would be laborious. However, three decrypts are instructive.  
VENONA 1119-1121 dated August of 1944 and reproduced in Appendix A confirms 
several details mentioned by both defectors. Specifically VENONA 1119-1121 states that during 
the time that Bentley was active, 1) White was meeting directly with a Soviet handler; 2) his 
friends were willing accomplices of espionage activities; 3) with bimonthly meetings, the 
number of people involved was considerable; 4) he proposed giving oral reports while driving 
around in his car as he did with Chambers; and 5) White was giving information directly. 
Unknown informants did not steal it out of his office without him being aware.  
VENONA 1634 shows the lengths to which controllers went to get to know their sources 
and the extent to which they interacted with them. It shows that Mrs. White was aware of her 
husband’s activities with the Silvermaster Group. Since it discusses the possibility of paying the 
college tuition for White’s daughter, the Turkish rug may not have been the only gift White 
received for his services on the behalf  of the Soviet People. 
Finally VENONA 79 highlights the attempts to promote personnel in government 
agencies and provides organizational details of the espionage rings in Washington, D.C.  
These decrypts show the breadth of activities of the Silvermaster Group. It also proves 
there was a sense of community within the group. This further bolsters Bentley’s claim to know 
about the activities of people she had not met. In the course of working with the few people with 
whom she did have direct contact, she would have learned many details of the lives, activities, 
and accomplishments of the others in her group. 
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ARGUMENTS FOR THE DEFENSE 
The exposed KGB archives and the VENONA decrypts lend support and validity to the 
defectors, investigations, and the espionage-related show trials of the 1940s and 1950s. As such 
material has not been well received by some Cold War revisionists and apologists for the various 
Red Scare “victims.” Reaction to the new material has been diverse. Many have accepted and 
integrated the recent information into a newer understanding of the era. Others resist this new 
perspective. 
The revisionist response has been to attack the traditionalist scholars, their credibility, 
and methodology. Writers supportive of White and others have either questioned or ignored 
references to KGB, Comintern, and CPUSA archives and their use.33
Those who support accused Soviet agents such as White have also attempted to use the 
KGB archives to their own advantage. The late Soviet general Dimitri Volkogonov researched 
the KGB archives at the request of John Lowenthal. In October of 1992, Volkogonov wrote 
Lowenthal stating that after researching the archives of the Soviet Union’s intelligence agencies 
“I can inform you that Alger Hiss was never an agent of the intelligence services of the Soviet 
Union.” Revisionists widely heralded this admission as proof and vindication of their defense of 
Hiss. What they ignored was Volkogonov’s recantation one month later. Inquiry into his 
statement by skeptical scholars led Volkogonov to admit that he only spent two days with the 
KGB files. The GRU archives were closed to him and Hiss had worked for the GRU and not the 
KGB. Although Hiss seemed to accept the reversal with some aplomb, Lowenthal refused to 
acknowledge the retraction. In his 2000 essay defending Hiss (discussed below), Lowenthal 
mentions Volkogonov’s assertion of Hiss’ innocence without mentioning the disclaimer.34
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 If revisionist had lost an ally with Volkogonov, they have recently gained a new one in 
Major-General (SVR) Julius N. Kobyakov. Recently, on the internet discussion site H-DIPLO, 
he claimed that he was the one who performed the research for Volkogonov. He later claimed 
that neither White nor Currie knew they were agents. Again revisionists accept his claims while 
trad-itionalists and post-revisionists question them. Kobyakov claimed to have written the letter 
sent by Volkogonov. That letter stated that “Hiss was not registered in the [KGB] documents as 
a recruited agent.” According to GRU spymaster Pavel Sudoplatov, GRU recruitment investiga-
tions were thorough but documentation was haphazard until the 1940s. Further, Kobyakov’s first 
posting was rather vague whether he had actually examined the GRU files or not. Later he clar-
ified himself and stated that he had asked the GRU to look for mention of Hiss and they replied 
to the negative. John C. Zimmerman added on H-DIPLO that it is in the Russian security organ-
izations’ best interest to deny anybody’s association with them. It has always been official GRU 
and KGB/SVR policy that if an agent or his surviving relatives deny his involvement the agency 
supports such denials. Exposing former agents would cripple future recruitment. In this vein, the 
SVR denounces books and threatens authors who expose former agents and operations. Many of 
these authors have fled to the West, gone into hiding, and/or refuse to divulge information that 
may identify relatives residing in Russia. Considering the wealth of independent evidence point-
ing to White or Hiss as agents or sources for the Soviet Union, some believe that Kobyakov’s 
undocumented and undocumentable claims may be part of Russia’s disinformation policies.35  
The VENONA decrypts have met a similar two-sided reaction. Most historians see the 
need to integrate VENONA’s revelations into the accepted narrative. An extreme reaction 
against the decrypts would be William Kunstler who charged that the whole project is a giant 
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government fabrication. Similarly Brian Villa of the University of Ottawa has stated that there is 
another VENONA-like project still hidden that would change the entire context of the messages 
when finally revealed. Claiming there is a government conspiracy is one thing, proving it is 
another. Considering the difficulty with successfully forging one historical document, producing 
thousands of undetectable false messages is virtually impossible. Those charging conspiracy or 
forgery ignore the facts that Russian espionage experts have praised the decrypts’ accuracy and 
some researchers have found the original cables in Moscow.36  
A more reasoned attempt to explain away VENONA takes the approach that the interpre-
tation of the messages is faulty. One such approach states that the messages are merely the 
boastful, exaggerated claims of field operatives about agent activity, some of whom may not 
even exist, to their superiors in Moscow. Considering Moscow’s screening process for agents, 
this explanation is unlikely. Moscow vetted potential agents extensively and shifted handlers 
periodically to eliminate just this kind of deceitful activity. The Kremlin’s anxiety over inform-
ation bordered on the paranoid. Kobyakov’s claim that “in a spirit of machismo, many people 
claimed [the Soviets] had an ‘agent’ in the White House” implies that Soviet espionage activity 
was some kind of huge fraternity prank gone wrong. He ignores the culture and times in which 
Soviet spies operated. In the Great Terror of the 1930s and the purges just before and after 
Stalin’s death, Moscow used the GRU and the KGB against one another. In every instances the 
first move by those in power was to use the GRU to purge the KGB secretly. Before the Great 
Terror officially started, more than 3,000 KGB agents were shot on GRU orders. After they 
accomplished their purge of the KGB, the Kremlin turned the KGB lose on the Army’s General 
Staff. The KGB and the GRU hated the other passionately. Isak Akhmerov is one of two agents 
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associated with the “machismo” comment about agents in the White House. Moscow recalled 
Akhmerov, examined his record and eventually returned him to service. Akhmerov survived the 
Great Terror. Had Moscow found any indiscretions he would have quietly disappeared. Instead, 
he returned to the U.S. many years later to continue his career as a spy. While it is true that every 
good intelligence agency has its disinformation branch, the VENONA messages were reports of 
field agents to the home office. This is the one kind of communication where honesty and clarity 
are essential. VENONA has its limitations; internal obfuscation is not one of them.37
Lowenthal made a much more reasoned challenge to the VENONA decrypts in a 2000 
article in Intelligence and National Security. His primary objective was to uphold his client’s 
innocence by showing that a tentative identification of Hiss in a VENONA decrypt is unjustified. 
His article also questions VENONA’s objectivity, reliability and accuracy.38 It is outside the 
scope of this thesis to weigh-in on the Hiss Case. Discussion of some aspects of Hiss’ life is 
necessary to examine this criticism of VENONA. 
VENONA only identifies Hiss, tentatively, by a code name in VENONA 1822. Moscow 
received VENONA 1822 on or before 30 March 1945. Its author, an unidentified A, recounts a 
“chat” he had with an information source known as ALES. ALES had been working with the 
GRU since 1935. His small group, “for the most part consisting of his relations,” had recently 
received decorations from the Soviets for their service. A short time before meeting with A, 
ALES had talked with a Soviet official who relayed the GRU’s gratitude to ALES. ALES 
believed the official was Comrade Vyshinski. The meeting with Vyshinski happened after the 
Yalta Conference. A footnote listed ALES as “Probably Alger Hiss.” This is the main contention 
of Lowenthal’s article -- the assignment of ALES to Hiss was not definite and is disputable.39
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In his article Lowenthal tries to show that the details of VENONA 1822 do not fit with 
what we know of Hiss’s life and the accusations against him. His reading of paragraph 6 of the 
decrypt was the most controversial. This paragraph states “After the Yalta Conference, when he 
had gone on to Moscow, a Soviet personage in a very responsible position (ALES gave to 
understand that it was Comrade Vyshinski) allegedly got in touch with ALES...” Lowenthal 
wants to read this passage as saying that Vyshinski was the one going on to Moscow after the 
Yalta Conference. It was only afterwards that Vyshinski contacted ALES. Thus ALES was not at 
the Yalta Conference as so many have assumed. Therefore, since Hiss was at the Yalta 
Conference, he could not have been ALES and VENONA 1822 proves it.40  
 In his conclusion he states, “The fact that Venona’s obvious mistakes about Hiss have 
gone unrecognized and uncorrected ... for half a century is a testament to the power of myth over 
empirical reality. It is also a warning to view other Venona product [sic] with caution and scept-
icism.”41  Lowenthal thus seemingly proved his client’s innocence and wrecked the credibility of 
an important resource. No one challenged Lowenthal’s premise for several years. A libel lawsuit 
had the effect of delaying discussion of the article until after his death in 2003. Thus, he could 
not answer his critics in the recent academic debates over his article.42
Two works seriously undermine Lowenthal’s arguments --  John Earl Haynes and Harvey 
Klehr’s In Denial (San Fransisco, 2004) and Eduard Mark’s ‘Who Was ‘Venona’s’ ‘Ales’? 
Cryptanalysis and the Hiss Case” also published in Intelligence and National Security (2003).  
Haynes and Klehr deal with many historical inaccuracies in Lowenthal’s article and his 
analysis of VENONA 1822. Lowenthal’s reading of paragraph 6 is difficult if not impossible to 
reconcile with the rest of VENONA 1822. The most logical reading assumes that it was ALES 
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who left the Yalta Conference for Moscow not Vyshinski -- though Vyshinski was at Yalta. How 
one reads this paragraph is important. If ALES, a State Department employee, went to Moscow 
after Yalta, then he is one of a very small group of people. The only State Department employees 
to travel to Moscow after Yalta were Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius and a small party of 
seven that accompanied him. While there, the group attended two social functions at the same 
time as Vyshinski; the perfect place for someone to pass on the GRU’s gratitude without 
arousing any suspicions. Alger Hiss was in that group. Of all the members of that group, only 
Hiss fulfills all the requirements set forth in VENONA 1822.43  
Mark challenges Lowenthal’s conclusion from the other direction. If Lowenthal’s reading 
is correct, Mark says, then sometime between the end of the Yalta Conference, on 12 February, 
and the posting of the cable, about six weeks later, ALES had to talk to Vyshinski and then have 
his chat with the KGB’s mysterious A. In that period Vyshinski did not travel to the U.S. as 
Lowenthal implies. The only place Vyshinski traveled to during that time was Bucharest. No one 
in the small State Department staff in Bucharest either fulfilled the requirements to be ALES or 
left Rumania for the States at that time. Lowenthal’s reading is totally impossible, logically and 
logistically. According to Haynes, Klehr, and Mark, contrary to Lowenthal’s premise, VENONA 
1822 further implicates Hiss as a spy and confirms the accuracy and integrity of the VENONA 
decrypts and analysts.44
Within the literature of the meaning of Soviet espionage, the Russian archives, and 
VENONA, James M. Boughton has emerged as the most loyal supporter of Harry Dexter White. 
His best defense of White is his 2001 article in History of Political Economy, “The Case against 
Harry Dexter White: Still Not Proven.” 
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Boughton’s defense of White touches on eight points. First, Chambers’ allegations about 
White are contradictory and uncorroborated. Second is that all other 1940s era defectors have no 
first-hand knowledge about White. People like Bentley and Katherine Perlo only repeated what 
others told them. Third, KGB agent Vitali Pavlov’s account of his meeting with White concludes 
by saying that White was never an agent. Next, Boughton brings up the issue of guilt by associa-
tion. Having friends and co-workers who were fellow travelers, communists and active Soviet 
agents somehow means you were one as well. Allied to this is his next line of defense that 
White’s ambiguous policy decisions do not make him a Soviet agent of influence. Again, in the 
postwar era, once White’s sympathies were suspect so was his policy record. Boughton’s sixth 
argument says White, and others accused of espionage, should be assumed innocent until proven 
guilty. This supports his next point, that VENONA, read with a presupposed innocence, does not 
implicate him in active espionage. Researchers cannot verify the Russian archives and, therefore, 
cannot prove guilt. Lastly, Boughton, as do others such as Craig, argues that evidence indicating 
White worked with Soviets or their agents was either loose talk among friends or part of White’s 
talking with Soviet officials during his official duties.45  
This thesis has already addressed some of Boughton’s arguments. Discussion of his other 
arguments, will be occur in the proper context or within the concluding summary. 
Most historians have accepted the new insights provided by the limited intelligence 
information recently revealed in Moscow and Washington, D.C. The arguments of others, while 
they may look good at first glance, cannot withstand intense scrutiny and reveal a limited or 
unrealistic knowledge of events or the reality of covert operations. 
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THE MORGENTHAU PLAN 
On 6 August, 1944, Henry Morgenthau, Harry Dexter White, and a small staff boarded a 
C-54 Skymaster in Maine for a twenty-two hour trip to England. A simple administrative act by 
White radically changed Morgenthau’s agenda for the trip and lit the fuse of a political time-
bomb. White had a handful of papers that he needed to discuss with Morgenthau. White used this 
trip to do so.46
One of these papers was “Report on Reparations, Restitution, and Property Rights,” a set 
of guidelines for the “German Problem.” The Executive Committee on Economic and Foreign 
Policy (ECEFP), an interagency committee headed by Assistant Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson, prepared the paper. Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin had agreed at Teheran that they 
must give Germany a hard peace and this paper was the State Department’s and War 
Departments’ joint proposal for carrying out the harsh policy of the Teheran Conference.47
For White and Morgenthau the ECEFP plan did not go far enough. White wanted the 
entire German war machine dismantled. He felt the current recommendations would make it 
possible for the Germans to go to war again in less than twenty years. Given that Germany had 
initiated two world wars in his lifetime, White wanted a deindustrialized Germany after the war 
so the militarily aggressive Germans could not threaten world peace again. He knew Morgenthau 
felt the same but White was not prepared for the violence of the Secretary’s reaction.48  
Morgenthau did not want Germany ever dominating Europe again. Until 1944 Roosevelt 
had refused to give any guidance on postwar Germany. Morgenthau took it upon himself to take 
the lead in establishing a punitive foreign policy guideline. In his meeting with Eisenhower the 
next day in Portsmouth, Morgenthau discussed Germany’s future with the general. Eisenhower 
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favored Morgenthau’s tough policy for Germany. On 12 August, Morgenthau addressed a group 
of U.S. and British diplomats and officials involved in postwar planning. White summarized his 
rambling ideas on Germany’s future for the group giving some the impression that White had 
given more time and thought to the issue. Few present were enthusiastic about Morgenthau’s 
program but no one was ready to challenge him publicly. Afterward, when British officials 
pointed out to Morgenthau that the pastoralization of Germany was impossible given the ratio of 
people to farmland. A vindictive Morgenthau replied that the surplus population “should be 
dumped into North Africa.” Morgenthau wanted the factories and mills wrecked and the mines 
flooded.49
Back in Washington, D.C., Morgenthau lobbied heavily with Roosevelt for the 
acceptance of his ideas on Germany.  Feeling victory was near, the fact that there was no plan to 
deal with a defeated Germany disturbed Roosevelt. Roosevelt then decided that the Secretaries 
of State, War, and Treasury, directed by his personal aide, Harry Hopkins, should meet to work 
out a plan for postwar Germany. While the secretaries’ deputies met with Hopkins on 2 
September, Morgenthau had tea with the President and First Lady at Hyde Park. He spent the 
time elaborating on his ideas. On 5 September the full committee met. Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull, thinking that Morgenthau’s proposals and comments reflected Roosevelt’s personal 
position, abandoned his earlier moderate position. Only Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson held 
out for a more moderate course of action. The next day the three secretaries met with the 
President. Hull, realizing that Roosevelt was more conciliatory, abandoned his previous hard line 
position for Stimson’s more moderate one. On 9 September, Morgenthau asked for another 
chance to present his agenda. Later that day, Roosevelt and Morgenthau were on the same train 
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to Hyde Park. Morgenthau spent the entire trip and weekend with the President expanding on his 
proposal. As a result, three days later, Roosevelt asked Morgenthau, not Hull or Stimson, to 
travel to Quebec to explain the U.S. position to Churchill.50
Quebec was the high point of Morgenthau’s draconian plan for Germany. Indeed, 
Morgenthau considered Quebec the capstone of his career. His euphoria would not last long. 
Hull, Stimson, and others disliked Morgenthau’s backdoor tactics and misuse of his friendship 
with the President. Opposition to the Morgenthau Plan increased. Hull felt Morgenthau’s plan 
was “mad”; Stimson went further and said it was “Jewish vengeance” and was not in accord with 
Roosevelt’s humanitarian record. Worse, Morgenthau tried to create public support for his plan 
by leaking the broad outline of it to the press. 1944 was an election year and Roosevelt began to 
distance himself from what he now saw as a “false step.” Harsh treatment of the Germans was 
not popular with either the public or the soldiers in Europe. Joseph Goebbels, Hitler’s 
propagandist, ran the banner headline -- “ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL AGREE TO 
JEWISH MURDER PLAN!” General George Marshall said that it was stiffening German 
resistance on the battlefield. Thomas Dewey, the Republican candidate for the presidency 
declared the Morgenthau Plan was as useful “as ten fresh divisions” to Hitler. Morgenthau began 
to find himself increasingly isolated from presidential favor. Plans for the radical restructuring of 
postwar Germany would languish. When Roosevelt died on 11 April 1945, the Morgenthau Plan 
died as well.51
What was Harry Dexter White’s role in the formulation of the Morgenthau Plan? Both 
Budenz and Bentley claimed that White was acting on orders from Moscow in devising and 
pushing the plan. Both claims are problematic. Budenz, in an FBI interview on 17 December 
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1953, stated that he heard that White authored the Morgenthau Plan during a staff meeting of the 
Daily Worker. This was just weeks after there had been a lot of press about White’s espionage 
activity. Budenz’s statement evokes images of communist workers standing around the water 
cooler discussing the latest activities of Soviet agents. 
Bentley’s charge that White “on [the Soviet Union’s] instructions pushed for the 
Morgenthau Plan” needs context. On one hand, in 1944, the Soviet Union had no clear idea  
what form they wanted for postwar Europe, much less Germany. As late as June 1945, 
communist strategy for Germany required both a divided and a united Germany. Because of this 
it is hard to imagine Moscow directing White, or anyone else, to formulate an American plan 
that would benefit the Soviets in 1944. Russian archives do show that someone “close to the 
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau” leaked the broad outline of the Morgenthau Plan to 
Moscow. It was on Russian desks by 1 October 1944. On the other hand, Morgenthau’s son 
claims that White did author the original concepts but that his father went beyond anything 
White could have imagined. Discussions between White and Morgenthau on Germany’s postwar 
future began by July of 1942. Morgenthau, after reading the FBI’s file on White in 1952, 
wondered for the rest of his life to what extent White had maneuvered him into pro-Soviet 
positions. As sensational as Budenz and Bentley’s claims about the origin of the Morgenthau 
Plan were in the early 1950s, they must be modulated. The idea the U.S. could take a unilateral 
position on postwar Germany was Cold War superpower hubris. All members of the Grand 
Alliance would have to agree to the final details.52
 
 26
OPERATION “SNOW” 
 
After the end of the Cold War, retired KGB agent Vitali Pavlov revealed a previously 
unknown incident of attempted policy subversion by Harry Dexter White. Pavlov’s “The Time 
Has Come to Talk About ‘Operation Snow’” (Moscow, 1995) recounts his meeting with White 
in 1941. Jerrold and Leona Schecter’s Sacred Secrets (Washington, D.C., 2002) provides the 
context for Pavlov’s narrative. 
In 1938, Soviet and Japanese fought many skirmishes across the common border their 
troops occupied along the Manchurian and Mongolian frontiers. Skirmishes, beginning in 1939, 
gradually grew into open warfare by the middle of the year. In a battle at Khalkhin-Gol on 20 
August, the Soviets threw the Japanese back across the Manchurian border.53
The true importance of this battle was its timing. On 23 August 1939, three days after the 
onset of the battle at Khalkhin-Gol, Hitler and Stalin announced their Non-Aggression Pact. 
While Moscow had been negotiating this treaty with Berlin, the Soviets were fighting a major 
campaign against Hitler’s ally Japan. Stalin feared a two-front war against Germany and Japan. 
After their defeat at Khalkhin-Gol and the announcement of the Non-Aggression Pact, Japan, 
realized that the Germans would not help them in a war with the Soviet Union. In mid-
September, Tokyo signed a non-aggression pact with Moscow. Only after he had secured his 
Eastern border, did Stalin then turn and attack Poland on 17 September.54
Stalin now had non-aggression and neutrality treaties with the major powers on his 
borders. Still, Moscow was uneasy about its security. Stalin initiated negotiations with Hitler 
about joining the Tripartite Pact. Stalin also wanted to divert Japan’s ambitions away from 
Russia on Japan’s northern flank to the European empires to the south and the southwest. Would 
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Japan attack in Siberia? Japan, like Russia and Germany, knew war was coming and wanted to 
avoid a two-front war. Japan’s dilemma was whether to take a northern tack against the Soviet 
Union or a southern one against China and Indochina.55  
Moscow’s intelligence services took an active role in attempting to deflect the Japanese 
away from the Soviet Union. First was their operative in Tokyo, Richard Sorge. Sorge controlled 
an agent of influence, Ozaki Hotsumi. Ozaki was a spokesman for the South Manchurian 
Railroad and had traveled extensively in China. Because of his experience in China, he had the 
ear and confidence of several Cabinet Ministers in Tokyo. He was also a Communist 
sympathizer. When asked his views on Japanese expansion, he focused on the fact that Siberia 
had few developed natural resources. Therefore, he stressed that the logical direction for Japan 
should be south to resource-rich Indochina. As an agent of influence, Ozaki failed to mention the 
possible U.S. response to such a policy.56
Pavlov’s article recounts Moscow’s efforts in Washington, D.C. Vitali Pavlov was 
twenty-seven when he came to America for this mission. The Soviets had drafted him into the 
Intelligence Service in 1938 and he survived Stalin’s prewar purges due to his youth and 
inexperience. By 1939 he became the assistant to the Chief of Military Section for work in the 
United States and Canada. Pavlov then met with Isak Akhmerov. Akhmerov had run the 
Silvermaster Group before they recalled him to Moscow. Akhmerov and Pavlov discussed 
American intelligence assets used by the Soviets in the 1930s.  Their goal was to find an official 
that could help formulate a U.S. policy that would dissuade Japan from attacking Soviet Siberia. 
The goal was to reactivate a U.S. agent of influence similar to Ozaki in Japan. Of all 
Akhmerov’s earlier contacts, the one they decided to contact was Harry Dexter White.57
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Contact with U.S. spy rings had lapsed in the early 1940s. The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggres-
sion Pact, the Great Terror of 1937-1939, and  Whittaker Chambers’ defection led to many 
sources quitting in protest and forced a shakeup in some American organizations and operations. 
Therefore, one of Pavlov’s biggest concerns was how White would greet a new emissary from 
Moscow. White had been chosen with care. Akhmerov had met personally with White. White 
knew Akhmerov as BILL. (In fact the operation was not code-named “Snow” until White was 
selected. The association between the two names was not coincidental.) As it turned out there 
was no need for concern -- White was still a true believer.58
The purpose of the mission was to present a series of policy initiatives to White. The 
Soviets’ intent was for White to inject them into Washington’s foreign policy discussion 
concerning Japan. They included the position that U.S. could not accept unlimited Japanese 
expansion in the Pacific effecting U.S. interests. The initiatives stressed that Washington was 
capable, by either economic or military means, of preventing Japanese aggression. However the 
U.S. preferred to negotiate a mutually agreeable solution provided that the Japan cease 
aggression in China and the surrounding territory, evacuate its military from the mainland, stop 
its expansionist policy in the region, and withdraw its troops from Manchuria.59
When Akhmerov first met White he had posed as an expert in Chinese affairs traveling to 
China and the Far East. Pavlov’s cover story was that he had lived in China for a long time and 
was an associate of BILL. When they met for lunch in May of 1941, Pavlov said he had a mess-
age from BILL. The “message” was a handwritten note that listed the results of BILL’s “re-
search” into Japanese-American relations that BILL thought would help America counter Jap-
anese expansion. When pressed for his views on the content, White agreed with BILL’s assess-
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ment of the situation. Pavlov’s comment about living in China was to explain his inadequate 
English. Because of this, White spoke slowly and distinctly and asked Pavlov if he understood. 
Pavlov then repeated White’s message to BILL to assure White that he had gotten it right.60
Akhmerov debriefed Pavlov when he, Pavlov, returned to Moscow. Akhmerov was 
confident White had accepted BILL’s advice and would act on it. Later, other contacts informed 
Akhmerov that White asked mutual acquaintances of BILL about his whereabouts. White wanted 
to thank BILL for some ideas that he had used with great success. Pavlov’s superiors told him to 
forget everything about the operation and leave no written account of any part of it. Pavlov did 
so until the mid 1990s when he read Congressman Hamilton Fish’s Memoir of an American 
Patriot (Washington: Regenery Publishers, 1991). In the appendix of his book Congressman 
Fish listed two of White’s memoranda to Morgenthau written on 6 June and 17 November of 
1941. Reading these brought the entire operation back to Pavlov’s mind. As a result he wrote up 
the details of “Operation Snow” for the general public.61
It is unknown whether Pavlov’s recommendation to White was implicit or explicit. 
Regardless, White got the message and acted on it. His memorandum to Secretary of the 
Treasury Morgenthau shortly after meeting Pavlov contained a pro-Soviet anti-British slant. 
Rees concurs that White’s last memorandum concerning the Japanese negotiations was 
incorporated into Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s final ten point dispatch to Tokyo.62 Hull’s use 
of the harsh, demanding language made his peace and trade-initiatives appeared as ultimatums. 
This only strengthened the positions of the war party in Tokyo.63
In response to Japan’s apparent intransigence, Roosevelt accepted White’s proposals for 
economic sanctions against Japan. On 26 July Roosevelt implemented a full scale economic 
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blockade, froze Japanese assets overseas, and cut off their access to American oil. Japan then 
abandoned all plans against Siberia and firmly took the road to Pearl Harbor. An uncritical 
reading of Pavlov’s article leads one to believe that due to White’s involvement and influence, 
the U.S. set up a foreign policy that placed the Kremlin’s interests ahead of the White House’s.64
Pavlov’s tale of “Operation Snow” needs to be taken with a grain of salt. One problem is 
that Roosevelt was anti-Japanese to begin with. Most likely, the U.S. position toward Japan 
would have been much the same despite  White’s efforts. Another argument is that Pavlov’s 
story is just a bit hard to believe. Did the Soviets really think they could talk to one man and alter 
U.S. foreign policy? Finally, did Pavlov seriously affect White’s thinking on this entire issue? 
All this misses the point. Russia, in 1940 and early 1941, was in the jaws of a vice. A two front 
war would have gone very badly for the Soviets. In the midst of doubt, uncertainty and fear 
Moscow authorized Pavlov to go to Washington, D.C. Whether “Operation Snow” had any 
chance of success, Moscow still tried. Of all Akhmerov’s previous contacts, he chose White as 
the one able and willing to aid the Soviet Union. White willingly met with a man with a thick 
Russian accent who claimed to be from China and wanted to discuss and advise on U.S.-
Japanese policy. This was in May of 1941 at least a month before Hitler attacked Stalin turning 
the latter into a U.S. ally. It is quite unusual that a monetary expert, who espoused free trade to 
promote peace, instead framed a policy of economic embargo on a belligerent nation that 
eventually helped to drive it to war against the U.S. The viability, success and failure of the 
attempt are less important than the target of desperate Soviet maneuvering and his response. 
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THE FALL OF CHINA 
On 1 October, 1949, Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung forced the Nationalist 
Kuomintang army under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek off mainland China and established the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). For the second time in little more than thirty years, a major 
nation had come under Communist rule. Leaders on both sides of Congress wanted to know why 
and who was responsible. The answers to those questions are still unclear.65
Harry Dexter White’s name surfaced in the debate. Chiang Kai-shek himself would claim 
that White and his staff sabotaged his government’s economic policies. Elizabeth Bentley stated 
that White’s contribution was to delay economic assistance to Chiang by withholding gold 
shipments to China. These accusations carried some weight because White was intimately 
involved with financial aid to China.66  
Before Pearl Harbor, both the U.S. and Russia sought ways to help the Chinese. Secretary 
of War Stimson mentioned to Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, China must be kept in the war “at 
any price.” As an expert in Chinese and Japanese monetary policy, Harry Dexter White observed 
that China was “fighting Russia’s war.” Aware of China’s need for assistance, in January of 
1940, White asked Morgenthau to suggest that Roosevelt request a $50 million loan for China. 
The Treasury Department negotiated a complex three-way import/export arrangement between 
the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union. This loan was to support China’s sagging economy and 
provide them the means to resist the Japanese militarily. As late as four weeks before Pearl 
Harbor, Roosevelt ordered Morgenthau to make another $50 million loan to the Chinese.67
Soon after Pearl Harbor, Chiang made a request for a billion-dollar loan to halt the steady 
decline of the Chinese economy. Apprized of the request, Roosevelt sent a note to Morgenthau 
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stating, “I am anxious to help Chiang Kai-shek and his currency. I hope you can invent some 
way of doing this . . . even if it means a partial loss [to the U.S.] later on.” Meetings on the 
matter between the Treasury Department and the State Department formed the consensus that 
they needed significant military action in China to counter Japanese aggression. It was also 
essential that Chiang’s economy stabilize to help the war effort. Representatives of the State and 
Treasury Departments and the White House worked out the details for legislation for the $500 
million loan. The bill passed Congress in mid-February and Roosevelt signed it in March.68
Both Morgenthau and White believed that Chiang was close to establishing a separate 
peace with Japan. This concern led both men to hold a tight rein over moneys issued to China. 
Their intent was to insure that Chiang continued hostilities.69  They developed two clear goals. 
First, they wanted to restrict the release of funds to achieve critical objectives. Second, they 
wanted to use the funds to keep Chiang focused on the Allied goal of fighting the Japanese. 
White would monitor and authorize funds only under strict circumstances. There was bound to 
be tension and conflict. Within days of ratification of the legislation, the Chinese made their first 
requests for a transfer of funds. They made the mistake of asking for the funds without 
conferring with Treasury officials. When White found out about the request, he sent an angry 
letter to the Chinese representatives stating that they would receive no fund without first 
consulting the Treasury Department.70
 White became a “one man embargo” on funds to the Chinese. White proudly proclaimed 
to Morgenthau “we have stalled as much as we have dared...” The U.S. shipped very little gold 
in the first six months of 1945. The results of the meager gold shipments on China’s economy 
were predictable. During the war years prices in China rose a hundred fold.71
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Despite White and Morgenthau’s suspicions, Chiang’s Nationalist government had a host 
of other difficulties unrelated to gold shipments. Anne W. Carroll’s internet article, “Who Lost 
China,” examines Chiang’s various difficulties. The Japanese occupied the industrial areas of 
China. Refugees fleeing Japanese forces strained Chinese resources. Believing the allies would 
eventually defeat Japan, Chiang husbanded his meager assets for the postwar civil war with 
Mao’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Chiang’s policy for trading territory for resources made 
him seem unwilling to fight. Mao was far from the front and used the war to train his troops. 
Mao was able to appear more anti-Japanese than Chiang. Chiang’s army and government needed 
massive reform that was impossible to accomplish during the war. After the war, the Soviets 
turned captured war material over to the PLA. This gave Mao military parity to Chiang. U.S. 
policy during the resulting civil war limited Chiang’s ability to resist Mao’s PLA successfully. 
Was Harry Dexter White’s reluctance to release funds and gold to Chiang’s Nationalist 
government the cause for the communist victory in China? Or was it Japanese imperialism, 
Mao’s adeptness at propaganda and positive spin, Soviet support for the PLA, or badly formed 
U.S. foreign policy? The answer is so elusive that even the unabashedly anticommunist Carroll 
believes that “all of the above” is too simplistic an answer.72  
In the late-1940s and 1950s many individuals were associated with the “fall of China.” 
White was one of them. No one has ever associated his actions with distinct instructions from 
Moscow. The best anyone came up with was Budenz’s weak rationale that White’s seeming 
cooperation with and help for China in the late 30's and early 40's was a smoke screen so he 
could destroy Chiang’s government later without arousing suspicion. In short no evidence exists 
that instructions from Moscow directly influenced White’s activities regarding China.73
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THE ALLIED MARKS AFFAIR 
By September of 1946, Germany’s postwar economy was suffering from rampant 
inflation. By that time the U.S. War Department had a $250,000,000 overdraft in its Allied 
Military marks (AM marks) redemption budget. Congressional investigations led to the 
revelation that the U.S. had given the Soviets a set of AM marks printing plates and allowed 
them to print their own marks from unsupervised and unregulated presses.74  
In 1943, the U.S. and Britain had agreed that a unified currency should be used in 
occupied Germany after the war. They also agreed that it should be exclusively printed in the 
U.S. Later, U.S. government officials gave in to Soviet demands for their own set of printing 
plates. Moscow then printed up an inflationary amount of AM marks, which eventually cost the 
U.S. taxpayers over a quarter of a billion dollars. The Allied solution to postwar inflation in the 
Western Zone of Germany and Berlin was a change in their currency policy. This was the crucial 
reason Stalin instituted the Berlin Blockade.75
Again, Harry Dexter White figured prominently in the initial decision that led to the 
inflationary spiral in postwar Germany. It was Elizabeth Bentley’s 1951 autobiography that first 
associated White with this issue. Bentley’s accusation was that Moscow ordered White to pro-
duce samples of the currency so it could be counterfeited. However, in  Red Spy Queen (Chapel 
Hill, 2002), Kathryn S. Olmsted’s biography of Elizabeth Bentley, Olmsted concludes that 
Bentley’s charges were false. Indeed, Bentley was prone to elaborate in her testimony. However, 
this charge was her first extended fabrication. White’s apologists concur that Bentley’s overall 
story of espionage is true but it is when she gets into details that her credibility suffers.76 Yet, as 
will be shown, new evidence has recently become known that justifies the basis of her claims. 
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Shortly after the Teheran conference, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces 
(SHAEF) requested that a common currency be prepared for the occupation of Germany. In the 
spirit of cooperation expressed at Teheran, a common currency would be a show unity for the 
occupying powers. SHAEF’s planning was based on the successful occupation currency policies 
established in Italy. It was decided that the U.S. would print the AM marks.77  
On 17 January 1944, the U.S. State Department cabled Moscow outlining the U.S.-
British plan. It was not until 14 February that Averill Harriman, the U.S. ambassador to the 
Soviet Union, received a response from Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav M. 
Molotov. Molotov’s superiors agreed that a common currency was the best policy. However, 
Molotov’s reply added one additional condition. Moscow felt it would be “more correct” if the 
printing of the AM marks also took place within the Soviet Union. He ended the cable by asking 
to be informed when the plates, inks and paper were to be delivered.78  
Molotov’s cable set off a series of interdepartmental and international discussions and 
meetings. At first, the request was passed to Under-Secretary of the Treasury Daniel Bell, who 
conferred with the Alvin W. Hall, Director of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. Hall was 
adamantly against the idea. Never had two governments controlled the printing of one currency. 
It would violate all established currency security rules. Two sets of currency would make 
counterfeiting easier to do and harder to detect. Accountability would be impossible. Lastly, the 
contractor, the Forbes Company of Boston, might exit the contract. This would delay printing 
and thus deprive the occupying authority of timely delivery of their first batch of currency.79
Since White was responsible for military and occupational financial policy, he received 
Hall’s memorandum objecting to the request. He then called a meeting with Bell, Hall and other 
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Treasury officials for further discussion on 7 March. Initially agreeing with Hall’s arguments, 
White pointed out that the Soviets could construe this as a lack of confidence. Further he 
asserted this would not be in keeping with the administration’s policy of cooperation with the 
Soviet Union. Perhaps relieved, all attending agreed with White that they should not decide 
without bringing Secretary Morgenthau into the discussion. They thought that Morgenthau could 
probably persuade Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko to have Moscow withdraw the request. 
Also, it was felt the Department of State, the Department of War and the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff (CCS) should have a say in the outcome. Bringing others into the discussion would spare 
Treasury of the onus of rejecting the Soviet offer on a “narrow accountancy basis.”80
Morgenthau and White then met with Gromyko, on the 18th, in an attempt to get the 
Russians to withdraw their request. Gromyko pointed out that the Kremlin had been apprized of 
the technical difficulties but wanted the plates delivered anyway. Morgenthau explained that the 
U.S. was ready to supply them any amount of currency they needed. The refusal to turn over a 
set of plates was to prevent the Forbes Company from withdrawing from the contract. He added 
that the U.S. desire to maintain control of the printing was not based on lack of trust of the 
Soviet Union. Morgenthau also pointed out that the Soviets could receive marks faster from the 
U.S. than by setting up an independent Soviet printing operation. Gromyko said that still did not 
change his government’s position.81
Afterwards, Treasury officials discussed the prospect that a U.S. refusal to turn over a 
duplicate set of plates could lead to the Soviets printing their own occupation currency. White 
advanced the arguments that since the U.S. had offered to provide the Soviets an unlimited 
supply of AM marks, it hardly mattered where they were printed; that if the Soviets printed their 
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own distinct currency the other allies would be forced to accept it; and the U.S. had not been 
doing enough for the Soviets, so if they profited from having their own set of plates it would be a 
token of appreciation of their efforts. Hall and Bell were still opposed to surrendering the plates. 
Hall then drafted another memorandum outlining the objections to such an action. Included was 
the argument that the Soviets could not make exact duplicates of the U.S. printed notes and this 
made counterfeiting easier to accomplish and harder to detect. Also, if the Kremlin wanted to 
print their own notes, the U.S. Bureau of Engraving would be happy to assist them in the design 
and manufacturing of their own plates. In the final page of the memorandum White, or his 
assistant William Taylor, inserted a line stating “It may be politically undesirable at this time to 
give the appearance of a lack of financial uniformity among the three powers.” This sentence 
undermined the entire thrust of Hall’s objections.82
Morgenthau then temporized. He sent a letter to  President Roosevelt’s chief of staff, 
Adm. William Leahy, asking the CCS to decide. Morgenthau include a copy of Hall’s latest 
memorandum with the letter. He informed Leahy that surrendering a set of plates to Moscow 
would delay the delivery of currency to General Eisenhower. He also sent a copy of his letter to 
Leahy and Hall’s objections to Secretary of State Hull. The consensus of all the officials 
involved was to ask the Soviets to withdraw their demand.83  
Before writing Leahy, Morgenthau sent White, with Hall’s memorandum in hand, back to 
Gromyko one last time to convince the ambassador to withdraw the request. Gromyko asked 
several questions. According to White’s notes of the meeting Gromyko wanted to know “why 
the Forbes Company should object to giving a duplicate set of plates to his government. He said 
that, after all, the Soviet government was not a private corporation or an irresponsible 
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government ... “ White later said that Gromyko was “skeptical as to the reasoning contained in 
[Hall’s] memorandum.” Gromyko did notice Hall’s mention of the Soviet’s printing their own 
currency and asked if that were the official U.S. position. White replied that it was only one 
possible solution to the situation. In the end the meeting accomplished little.84
Morgenthau’s letters to Leahy and Hull initiated a broader effort to dissuade the Soviets. 
Cordell Hull cabled Ambassador Harriman to inform Molotov that the administration was 
consulting the CCS in the matter and they were likely to refuse the request. Earlier, on Roose-
velt’s instructions, Harriman had met with Stalin to inform him that insistence on this issue was 
dampening the spirit of cooperation. On 8 April Harriman received Molotov’s answer. It stated 
that the Soviets were unimpressed with U.S. objections and if the Treasury refused the plates, the 
Soviet Union was ready to proceed with manufacturing their own occupation currency.85
A week before Moscow’s final reply arrived. Leahy turned over Morgenthau’s letter to 
Leahy to the CCS. CCS then turned over the decision to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee 
(CCAC) for discussion. In a 1 April meeting at the Pentagon, Major General G. N. Macready, 
Britain’s representative on the CCAC, stated that the UK was against a duplicate printing. Such a 
situation could lead to the entire issue of currency being discredited. Later in the meeting, James 
C. Dunn, Director of the Office of European Affairs for the State Depart-ment, mentioned that 
the Soviets were still asking for the plates. The CCAC postponed a decision to get more inform-
ation from the Treasury. On 12 April the CCAC held its final meeting to discuss the matter. 
Major General John H. Hilldring, director of the U.S. Army’s Civil Affairs Division, stated that 
this decision was “too hot” for the CCS and could not be decided on military grounds. It was, he 
said, a political decision. Dunn immediately pointed out that though there were political consid-
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erations the CCS should decide the matter on technical grounds. Neither the State Department 
nor the CCS wanted to take responsibility for refusing the plates. White’s two representatives 
from the Treasury Department, Taylor and L. C. Aarons, supported Dunn. Dunn then announced 
that the Soviets still wanted their own plates. This announcement had some impact on the CCAC 
members. Hilldring stated that it would be advantageous, on military grounds, to have all the 
allies use the same currency. Dunn remarked that “it would have a very nice effect on the 
German people” if a single currency was used. Taylor observed that if the Soviets used their own 
currency they might also establish other independent monetary and fiscal programs as well.86  
Dunn and Taylor hoped that Hilldring’s comment about the military advantages of a 
common currency meant the CCS would decide. It was not to be. The CCS position was put into 
a letter on 13 April. The letter stated that production of the supply of AM marks needed by 
SHAEF should be fulfilled by 1 May. After that time “if the United States Treasury and the State 
Department, in conjunction with the Foreign Office and the British Treasury, decide to furnish 
duplicate plates to the Soviet government, it appears that this action could be taken any time 
after May 1, 1944.” Marshall also added that if the Soviets needed currency that SHAEF could 
release about two billion marks to them immediately.87
On 14 April, White received their reply and used the CCS letter to cut through all the 
bureaucratic red tape. White then called a meeting of Treasury officials. Without showing the 
letter to anyone he declared that “the Combined Chiefs of Staff had directed that the glass 
positives [of the plates] be turned over to the Russian government.” When White informed 
Morgenthau, he was preoccupied with other matters and seemed annoyed at the interruption. In 
discussing the issue with him, Morgenthau decided that the Forbes Company not be told of the 
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transfer to keep them from exiting the contract and thus delay the printing of the U.S. and British 
AM marks. The transfer was to be a military secret.88
At the end of the meeting Morgenthau made phone calls to Dunn and Gromyko. The first 
was to tell Dunn that Morgenthau was about to inform Gromyko that the plates were to be 
furnished to the Soviet Union and to ask if the State Department was willing to share the 
responsibility. Dunn’s reply was vague and evasive. Neither man mentioned the CCS letter. Not 
waiting for British consent, Morgenthau then called Gromyko and asked for a meeting that 
afternoon. Gromyko was delighted at the positive news. British concurrence arrived the next day. 
Basically, they said that if the U.S. authorities were satisfied the British would go along. On 21 
April, the Treasury Department delivered the duplicate plates to the Soviet Embassy in Washing-
ton, D.C. and on 24 May the plates, paper and inks for printing the AM marks left by air for 
Moscow.89
The results of White’s decision were disastrous. Moscow printed up enough AM marks 
to provide their entire army six years of back pay. There was little control on Soviet finance 
officers and soldiers were issued AM marks without regard for their regular pay grade. Soviet 
AM marks were issued with two caveats.  Soviet soldiers could not redeem them for rubles or 
send the money home. They could only spend them in occupied Germany or exchange them for 
another currency. Buying western goods was the most common form of expenditure. U.S. 
servicemen could exchange their AM marks for dollars and send them home. Black market 
activity thrived. A GI could buy a package of cigarettes for eight cents and resell them to a 
Russian soldier for 100 AM marks or $10. A 5-cent candy bar sold for $5. K-rations brought $20 
and a pound of coffee $25. G.I.s sold watches for the equivalent of $500 to $2500 each. By one 
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estimate, more than 33,000 GIs sent home an average of $12,000 from Berlin. Only when the 
U.S. Army reached an overdraft of $271,000,000 did Congress act.90  
Original Allied plans called for approximately fifteen billion AM marks to be printed. 
Four and a half billion would be in 1000-Mark notes for banking purposes only. The Allies put 
the other ten and a half billion into circulation. The Soviets would have had a share of the initial 
issue, but they were printing their own. Against this original plan the Soviets printed more than 
seventy-eight billion of their own AM marks. Washington considered this to be inflationary and 
destructive to the economic stability of postwar Germany. Moscow called it reparations.91
The question is: What was Harry Dexter White’s culpability in this? Rees, Craig and the 
Schecters clearly agree that White was the prime mover in the decision. It has only been recently 
that writers have begun to offer a defense of White concerning the AM marks plates.92
Craig attempts to absolve White with several broad arguments: 1) claiming Bentley’s 
charges against White were flawed to the point of being irrelevant; 2) pointing out his ideas was 
only mirroring the current administration’s foreign policy; 3) saying that his role was important, 
but not decisive; 4) inferring the  CCS letter of 13 April was open to several interpretations; 5) 
arguing that no one could have really foreseen the effects of giving the Soviets their own set of 
currency plates; and finally 6) explaining away a recently discovered KGB document stating that 
his actions conformed to Soviet issued instructions.93 This defense can and will be answered but 
it ignores other equally damaging arguments. 
Going over Bentley’s accusations as a defense implies her accusations are valid. It is 
understood she was lying about her involvement in this issue. Her story is that the espionage ring 
she was involved with asked for and received copies of the AM marks. These copies were then 
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flown to Moscow to see if they could be counterfeited. One look at them made Soviet experts 
realize they could not be duplicated. She then instructed White to secure the plates for the Soviet 
Union. Bentley’s timetable is fantastic. There was a minimum of a two week round trip for 
documents or items to travel from Washington, D.C. to Moscow and back again. There is no 
logical period in the schedule of printing the notes by Forbes and the final decision for this to 
happen. Second, since the matter of a common currency was freely discussed among several 
agencies and countries, White had openly sent to the Russians and the British copies of the notes 
for their input and comments. Earlier writers, with no knowledge of VENONA or the recent 
information from Moscow, admit Bentley’s story is flawed but either irrelevant or confirmed by 
sources other than Bentley or even Chambers. Since Craig, admits White was involved in 
espionage of one form or another, White’s actions must come under question.94
White was continually concerned that the refusal to give the Soviets their own printing 
plates would hurt US-Soviet relations, affect U.S. foreign policy and mar the progress made at 
the Teheran Conference. As such, White’s actions, arguments and final decision are seen by 
some as an innocent, even necessary, adherence to Roosevelt’s foreign policy ideals of 
cooperation with Moscow. Focusing on the spirit of Teheran is anachronistic. Neither Secretary 
Morgenthau nor Hull would learn the details of Teheran until the following summer. The focus 
of all the interagency meetings and negotiations with the Soviets were driven by the desire to get 
them to quietly withdraw their request. From Roosevelt on down, all communication and 
negotiation with the Soviets had this goal. White went to see Gromyko with Morgenthau to 
achieve this end. White returned once by himself so Gromyko could successfully argue the point 
with Moscow. In the CCAC meeting of 12 April the consensus was that, desirable as a common 
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currency might be, the official position still did not include delivering duplicate plates to the 
Soviets. Roosevelt’s policy was accommodation. Still, there were limits to what he would and 
would not do for the Soviets. There is no documentary evidence he was consulted. Furthermore, 
Roosevelt had two foreign policies: the public, Wilsonian one he used when addressing the 
public or Congress, and the realpolitik of Great Powers he discussed with Stalin. The differences 
in his foreign foreign policy and his domestic foreign policy were his personal property shared 
with only a few loyal insiders. No one has hinted White was in that group. Which policy was 
White pursuing and how did he know it was the right one?95
Looking at White’s concern for foreign policy ignores his real job. White’s responsibility 
in the Treasury was to advise on the financial and economic effects of the decision. Pushing the 
decision onto the Joint Chiefs and Secretary of State was a way for Treasury to avoid its own 
responsibility of giving decision-makers sound economic advice. White should not have been 
making foreign policy decisions as much as informing foreign policy makers of the economic 
and financial ramifications of their decisions. To say White was adhering to the prevailing 
foreign policy is to accentuate a minority opinion in a very complex landscape. 
Craig claims that White’s assistant William Taylor had more influence on the 
proceedings than White and the final decision was really made by Morgenthau and 
representatives of the State Department. Taylor’s “influence” is only supported by the fact that 
he attended more interagency meetings than White. He did this because White’s duties kept him 
busy on other matters and he, Taylor, attended as White’s assistant. Saying Taylor had more 
influence than White infers that Taylor was advancing his own agenda at these meetings or that 
he had a lot of influence on White’s thinking. No one advances the latter inference but by 
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contrast Craig and others have stated that White had considerable influence on Morgenthau.96 
This is part of a larger argument that wants to put the blame on Taylor, Morgenthau, Roosevelt’s 
foreign policy, or GIs who profited from the black market in postwar Germany; anybody but 
White himself. White’s responsibility for the decision to hand over duplicate plates to the 
Russians cannot be overlooked or denied.97  Morgenthau had given White the mandate to 
supervise and take responsibility for financial and economic affairs in which the Treasury might 
become involved in relation to the Army and Navy and civilian areas in which they would 
operate. The issue of duplicate plates clearly fell under White’s purview. Because of the trust 
Morgenthau placed in him, people would defer to White’s judgment. White’s responsibility for 
the decision has been obscured in several ways.98
This leads to the CCS letter of 13 April. As stated, White told his colleagues in the 
Treasury Department that the CCS had “directed” that  the plates be turned over to the Soviets. 
Then White went to Morgenthau to see how the Treasury Department wanted to respond to the 
CCS “approval.” White never showed the CCS letter to his staff or Morgenthau. As a result, 
during the 1947 Congressional hearing into the matter, most of the officials who testified said 
that Morgenthau’s decision was sanctioned by the CCS letter. It would take a long time for 
White’s interpretation of the letter to become known. The CCS made no decision. The Combined 
Chiefs’ letter stated they did not want to make a military decision on political matters. Not 
objecting is not the same as approving. The military leaders were deferring to the experts in the 
field of finance and policy. Further, they expected the British to be part of the process. The 
British were informed after the fact and had no serious option but to concur. Also, the plates 
were delivered to the Soviets before 1 May, the date set by the CCS. White not only took 
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liberties with the Joint Chiefs position, he betrayed the spirit of trust they expressed in it. White 
was aware that General Hilldring felt the Soviet arguments were “persuasive.” This information 
is used by Craig to justify White’s broad interpretation of the CCS letter. If this were true, then 
White should have also known that Hilldring also spoke for CCAC when he stated that the issue 
was “too hot” for the CCS to arbitrate. This view of Hilldring’s closes the door to any but a strict 
and literal reading.99
All the discussion of the transfer of plates is presented in a political or military 
framework. Yet the issues of printing and distributing a currency are essentially economic in 
nature. The results were economic as well for the U.S., the Soviet, and the German people. That 
there were political ramifications cannot be denied but the real problems involved were 
economic. Were the results unforeseeable as White’s apologists claim?100
During White’s meeting with Gromyko on 22 March, Gromyko stated “the Soviet 
government was not a private corporation or an irresponsible government.” White let the 
statement go unchallenged. How “responsible” was the Kremlin in economic matters? Soviet 
occupation practices in Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bessarabia in 1939-1940 are 
instructive. Unlike the areas of Eastern Europe occupied at the end of the war, these areas were 
considered “liberated” and subsequently incorporated into the Soviet Union proper. In order to 
ease the process of annexation, the Soviets had to lower the local standard of living and disrupt 
and destroy the prevailing socioeconomic structure. Their methods were simple, effective and 
brutal. To begin with the local currencies were still legal tender but so was the Russian ruble. 
The occupying Russian soldiers were paid in rubles and the established exchange rate inflated 
the ruble by as much as 2000 to 3000 per cent.101
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Overvaluing made the average Russian soldier extremely rich. Local shop owners found 
their stores filled with wealthy Russians buying everything in sight. This huge influx of rubles 
started a wave of inflation that native merchants did not notice or mind -- at first. The joy of full 
cash registers started to give way to the trouble of empty shelves. Local suppliers were no longer 
able to replace merchandise. This shortage was caused by Soviet purchasing agents that fanned 
out through the newly occupied nations buying up wholesale goods in warehouses and the 
production of local factories. Armed with overvalued rubles, these purchasing agents were able 
to outbid local distributors and merchants. What goods that were produced locally were being 
shipped to Russia not local businessmen. Added to local merchants oversupplied with 
inflationary rubles and little else was a devastated production infrastructure. Russian propaganda 
stated that their goal was to help raise the ordinary working man’s standard of living. To do this 
they froze prices and raised wages by as much as ten times. Merchants and factory owners 
caught in such a squeeze declared bankruptcy and closed their doors. Shortages of food and other 
necessities introduced growing inflation, a black market, and discontent among the population. 
These deliberate Soviet policies raised the cost of living but not the standard of living. Once 
annexation was complete, local stores and industries were then nationalized and their former 
owners arrested, stripped of their possessions, including their accumulated rubles, and shipped to 
the gulags of Siberia. Any workers still employed were then paid in rubles. Anybody who 
thought they could survive the new state of affairs by hanging on to their local moneys lost that 
when they were abolished.102
Harry Dexter White was the director of the U.S. Treasury Department’s Division of 
Monetary Research. His specialty was monetary policies of China, Japan, and all the major 
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belligerents in Europe, including the Soviet Union. To argue that neither White nor anybody else 
in the Treasury could have anticipated a similar policy ignores the warnings of Hall, Bell, and 
Macready. If White truly felt the decision about the transfer of plates was a political one, then he 
should have completely handed the matter over to the Department of State while informing them 
as forcefully as possible of the potential Soviet uses of those plates based on their past 
experience. As it was, White kept the Treasury focused on political matters and only expressed 
technical accountancy and delivery concerns to the CCS and State Department.103
The arguments of defense have now come full circle as the above calls White’s motives 
into question. A KGB document, dated 15 April 1944, has come to light in the last few years that 
may answer that question and put Bentley’s accusation into a broader context. This document 
states “[on] 14 April that Harry Dexter White following our instructions passed through to 
Silvermaster attained the positive decision of the Treasury Department to provide the Soviet side 
with the plates for engraving German occupation marks....” 
Only Bruce Craig has written in defense of White’s actions since this document has come 
to light.104 Craig’s approach to this evidence is two-fold. First, he states that it only suggests 
White was working for the Soviets. The other, is to discount the cable as not being truly 
espionage related.105  
To say the cable is only a suggestion means that White was already working to secure the 
plates for the Soviets when he was approached by Silvermaster in regards to the matter. This 
assumes some knowledge of when the instructions were passed on to White. Molotov’s first 
demand for the plates was received on 14 February. It was not until 7 March that White became 
involved in the discussion on the issue. Addressing the 7 March meeting, Craig observes that no 
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one felt White was being overly “pro-Russian” only advancing current U.S. policy. Craig also 
points out that there is no documentary evidence that White ever changed his mind on the issue. 
Evidently, any discussion with Silvermaster came during the three weeks between 14 February 
and 7 March. Craig, in discussing of the process of reaching a decision, states one would expect 
different actions on White’s part if he was working as an agent of influence. That may be so but 
it may also mean that White was much more subtle than Craig realizes. Ignoring past Soviet 
economic policy in occupied areas and focusing his people on political issues while asking the 
State Department and the CCS to make a decision based on technical currency issues was 
White’s consistent approach. An approach consistent with an agent of influence. As an agent of 
influence, his job was to shift policy without calling attention to the fact he was doing so.  
In attempting to wish the cable away, Craig states “There simply was no U.S. policy 
decision for the Soviets to subvert.”106 This contradicts the argument that White was advancing 
U.S. policy. There was either a U.S. policy White was following that could be bent to Soviet 
wishes or there was not. This is an inconsistency in Craig’s reasoning.  
One final observation on this argument. How much did Gromyko know about espionage 
activity in the U.S.? Most likely he did not know the nuts and bolts, day to day details of KGB 
operations and operatives. But he probably knew that there were highly placed people in the U.S. 
government working for the Soviets. During his final meeting alone with White, did he know 
White would not be taking a hard line with the U.S. position? In light of this cable, can one 
really agree with Craig that White “had done all [he] reasonably could to sway the Soviets.”?107
This KGB cable, despite Craig’s assertion otherwise, was related to viable espionage 
activities. As mentioned many KGB sources in the U.S. were run and operated on a very 
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unprofessional basis with little regard for traditional spycraft. Silvermaster had resisted the 
KGB’s efforts to reorganize and professionalize his circle of agents and sources. That changed in 
early 1944 when Akhmerov returned to the U.S. to rein in Silvermaster’s group. Moscow wanted 
more results in documents provided and policy influence. In light of this development, Craig 
sees the 15 April communiqué as nothing more than idle boasting on Akhmerov’s and 
Silvermaster’s part. He would have one believe that field agents and their controllers had no 
compunction about lying to Moscow and that anyone was permitted to decide what policies 
needed to be subverted. Akhmerov had been recalled during the Great Terror, charged by Beria 
himself and barely survived. He then had been put on reserve until his entire record could be 
reviewed. With this background it was unlikely Akhmerov would do anything to jeopardize his 
career and his life. Neither is the cable a boast about a policy coup Akhmerov and Silvermaster 
had pulled off. Moscow had several options with their request for the currency plates. One, they 
could ask for the plates with the intent of withdrawing it in exchange for concessions on other 
matters. They could ask for the plates and use U.S. reluctance to justify their own currency and 
administration policies in Eastern Europe free from Western control or interference. Lastly, they 
could insist on the plates for the leverage that printing their own AM marks afforded the Soviet 
Union. The decision of which policy to pursue would not have been left to members of a badly 
run network in a foreign country. Moscow would make that choice and issue orders to that 
affect. The cable can only be seen as a report of “mission accomplished.”108
Coming full circle back to Bentley’s statements, the cable gives renewed life to discred-
ited charges. It also weakens the other points of defense and returns to the original question. 
What was White’s responsibility for the final decision -- considerable. In this “pass-the-buck” 
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environment that was “too hot” for some participants, a man with a purpose could achieve much. 
The only official who repeatedly objected and would have denied the Soviets the plates was Dir-
ector Hall. Hall was overruled and effectively blunted by White in their first meeting. The decis-
ion was White’s because no one wanted to make the decision not to give the plates to Moscow.  
Much is made of the idea that this was a joint decision reached after extensive review by 
several officials in different departments. To quote Morgenthau’s biographer John Morton Blum 
-- “It was not primarily White’s decision, but the joint decision of the Treasury, State and War 
Departments, the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the British Government with General John Hill-
dring, Assistant Secretary of State James Dunn, and Morgenthau as major contributors to the 
final policy.”109  
Of the eight organizations or persons named none of them contributed to the “final 
policy.” The CCS and Gen. Hilldring, and by extension the War Department, refused to make a 
decision. Dunn, representing the State Department during the final CCAC meeting felt it was the 
CCS’s responsibility to affirm or deny the Soviet request. When Morgenthau called Dunn he told 
him the decision had been made and asked if the State Department want to accept part of the re-
sponsibility. Dunn equivocated. White did not ask for input from anyone. Morgenthau was asked 
how he wanted to implement the CCS directive. The British were asked the next day after the 
fact. The initiative and the decision were White’s alone. As to Morgenthau‘s comment during the 
final meeting that if he had “known the facts a decision would have been made at a much earlier 
date.” This comment must be taken in context. He was upset at having been interrupted doing 
other work. This can easily be explained as a boss taking his frustrations out on his subordinates. 
The comment does not fit in with his earlier actions of trying to convince the Soviets to 
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withdraw their request. Later, Morgenthau would take credit or responsibility. He had to. The 
alternative was to give the impression that he stood by and did nothing while an assistant -- with 
Communist sympathies -- ran the Treasury Department. His defense is worth noting: “My 
decision was correct both politically and militarily.” -- but not economically.110
White’s action is atypical in some respects as well. He was negotiating other issues with 
the Soviets. There was a multibillion dollar loan for the Soviet Union. Also, exchange rates for 
the AM marks were still undecided at the time. The acceptance or rejection of the request for the 
plates could have been tied to either one or both of these. White, the tough negotiator and 
creative problem solver should have seen some way to use these and other issues to the U.S.’s 
advantage. Concerning the Morgenthau Plan, White wanted a dismembered Germany. A 
common currency was anathema to this position. Refusing the Soviet request and leading them 
to the conclusion they should print their own notes fits in with White’s ideological agenda for 
Germany. White took neither of the more natural courses of action for himself.111
Finally, once the plates were sent off to Moscow, the War Department was left to its own 
devices in developing a responsible redemption policy. White was incensed when he learned of 
the black-market conditions in Germany. Whatever White’s motivation for surrendering the 
plates to Moscow, he knew the potential dangers of multiple sources of currency. His expertise 
was currency and currency policy. His strength was finding solutions to currency problems. If he 
was going to give up the plates he should have followed through with either assisting or 
monitoring the War Department’s redemption policy. His failure to do so is inexcusable.112 In a 
situation where the Treasury was making political and military decisions and the military was 
forming currency policy, maybe the Soviets did not need to interfere. 
 
 52
CONCLUDING ARGUMENTS AND VERDICT 
Given the presented testimony, evidence, information against him and arguments in his 
defense, was Harry Dexter White an agent of influence for the Soviet Union? What is the 
standard to be? Bruce Craig, in his book on White, Treasonable Doubt, addresses the criteria for 
historians. In a normal trial, the burden of proof is on the prosecution and a good defense 
attorney can get damaging evidence thrown out on technicalities. Judges decide what evidence is 
considered.  Juries then must decide the defendant’s fate. Criminal proceedings use a 
“reasonable doubt” standard. Civil cases use a “preponderance of evidence” standard. Craig 
points out that historical investigations do not operate exactly like the U.S. court system. 
Historians are both judge and jury. They have to decide what, of all available, evidence is 
significant and then render a verdict. Craig believes a historian’s standards must be higher than 
the preponderance of evidence but not to the point of reasonable doubt. One must determine that 
the preponderance of the evidence, even if circumstantial, links someone to espionage. Whatever 
the accusations one must also show that the person did commit the acts. Craig then adds a third 
criteria, that of mens rea or criminal intent of the accused.113
It is this last criterion that exculpates most of those accused of espionage in the 1940s. 
Such criterion requires one to read someone else’s mind. The secretive nature of espionage 
makes determining mens rea a difficult task. Many, like Chambers broke with the CPUSA and 
assumed a bourgeois persona. A case in point is Kim Philby, an agent dubbed “the spy of the 
century.” Philby was married three times before he finally defected and his last two wives had no 
idea he was a spy. He married his third wife after he lost his job at M.I.5 due to allegations of 
spying for the Soviets. She never suspected his true life. Philby was able to continue his 
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activities, even while under suspicion, because he knew there was no evidence against him. Had 
he not defected, no one would have been sure, one way or another, of his guilt. Mens Rea may be 
helpful after someone has made a judgment about espionage but it cannot be considered in 
making the determination.114
 James Boughton’s defense rests firmly on the “innocent until proven guilty” premise -- 
one that does not apply here. Bruce Craig’s conclusion is that the evidence against White is 
credible but falls back on mens rea to state that White meant well. John Haynes states that White 
was an agent of influence. His only question is how influential he actually was. The material 
covered has met the preponderance of evidence criteria. Chambers and Bentley tell 
complimentary stories about White’s activities. Katherine Perlo provides independent 
corroboration. VENONA and the Russian archives both are consistent in linking White to the 
Soviets’ GRU and KGB apparatuses, covert activity and the delivery of information and 
documents. In this context, Boughton’s reference to guilt by association is a valid argument but 
hollow. The shear weight of other evidence makes his position irrelevant.115
Reasonable doubt is determined differently. In White’s case, two counts are considered. 
White’s being an information source and being an agent of influence. Saying that White’s 
meetings with Soviets were part of his official duties attempts to establish doubt. Among the 
contacts Craig and Boughton apply this logic to is Vitali Pavlov. Pavlov passed himself off as a 
Sinologist not a Soviet official. Others include journalists and Akhmerov who, as an Illegal, 
would never pass himself off as a Soviet government officer. What he was discussing with these 
“officials” were intimate details of U.S. policy or negotiating positions. It would hardly be part 
of his official duties to reveal U.S. negotiating strategy or to receive policy advice, especially 
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from traveling academics or journalists. This line of reasoning may create doubt but it is not 
reasonable.116
We must examine the accusation of agent of influence against the background of White’s 
actions in their totality. Boughton establishes White’s innocence by compartmentalizing the 
evidence against him. He discusses Chambers separately from Bentley, he avoids VENONA’s 
corroboration by the archives and he never compares Pavlov’s statement with the claims of other 
Soviet operatives. This approach can see White as innocent only if it does not examine the 
evidence as a whole. In discussing the four events presuming to show White’s actions as an 
agent of influence, it was necessary to look at all aspects of the events to get a true picture of 
White’s involvement and efficacy in each instance. Taken individually, none, except the AM 
marks affair, shows enough evidence of policy subversion to prove the charge. Taken together, 
does a pattern or a larger narrative emerge? 
Policy subversion carries its own inherent reasonable doubt. John Haynes questions how 
effective an agent of influence can be. His argument against it rests on the fact and the presump-
tion that in a big enough bureaucracy so many people and agencies are involved in the decision 
making process that one person cannot hope to prevail over the conflicting agendas and authori-
ties involved in the process. There are several  fallacies in this argument. The first is that policy 
subversion only becomes improbable not impossible. In the right circumstances one motivated 
person can prevail. Second is that this line of reasoning assumes only one person is involved. 
Lastly it assumes that the subversion is a one time event. In Washington, D.C. during the 1930s 
and 1940s, the Soviets had multiple people in several departments. They also had a long range 
approach. With enough people on enough committees supporting one another over time you 
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could accomplish much. Even if successful only five per cent of the time, eventually one could 
create a climate favorable to a particular viewpoint.117
The discussion on the Morgenthau Plan is a case in point. History calls his plan for 
postwar Germany the “Morgenthau Plan” because his ideas almost prevailed. It shows what one 
determined man can do when there is no guidance from above. Roosevelt had not even divulged 
the details of the Tehran Conference and was upset that Morgenthau had been briefed on it by 
British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. Roosevelt left the decision making to Secretaries of the 
main departments involved. Morgenthau kept the other Secretaries away from Roosevelt while 
he pitched the President his own ideas for postwar Germany. His plan almost prevailed. The 
administration rejected it only when the details became public and after President Roosevelt 
started to back away from it. Otherwise, Morgenthau might have succeeded. No one has ever 
implicated Morgenthau in subversion but he shows that in the right conditions, one man can 
control policy making.118
Comparing White’s conduct with the Chinese gold shipments and the AM mark plates 
shows inconsistencies on his part. White’s need to treat the Soviets like any other ally drove his 
consideration to transfer the plates. Yet he did not treat the Soviets in the same way he treated 
the Chinese. When the Chinese asked for the first shipment of gold, White sent them a sharp 
letter explaining how they were to request shipments. When Gromyko claimed that the Soviet 
Union was not an irresponsible nation did White send him a chastising letter about their 
economic occupation practices in the Baltic states? White argued for gold to be withheld from 
the Chinese until they enacted economic reforms and to reserve some for postwar recovery 
expenses. White did not tie the AM marks plates to any internal reforms in the Soviet Union nor 
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any other conditions. After all the lend-lease the U.S. sent to the Soviets, White worked on a 
separate postwar recovery loan for Moscow. Boughton says that the decision to transfer the 
plates may not have been economically sound but was a wartime concession to an ally. White 
did not extend the same courtesy to the Chinese. White’s withholding gold shipments from 
Chiang did not cause the collapse of the Kuomintang but it did not help them either. In a 
complex situation he did what he could to weaken the opponent of a communist revolutionary 
group. Neither was it consistent with his policy toward the Soviets. 
White’s conduct during the AM marks discussion is a textbook case for any agents of 
influence. Work your way into a major decision making position. Keep others focused on issues 
outside their expertise. Tell associates that a third party has made the decision. Do not ask your 
superior to approve the decision but rather how they intend to implement it. Do not reveal crucial 
documentation so that three years later associates will still not know you made the decision and 
will testify before Congress that the third party was responsible. 
Within this mosaic of activity, Akhmerov’s instincts to select White as Pavlov’s contact 
in 1941 were excellent. White was the obvious “go-to-guy” for the Soviets. Morgenthau shows a 
clear example of one man openly attempting and nearly succeeding in bending U.S. policy to his 
will. With “Operation Snow,” White was a tertiary source. An advisor to an advisor, his ability 
to succeed depended on his ability to convince his superior to convince his superiors -- obviously 
a near impossibility. Still White tried. With China, he was a small piece in a larger puzzle but he 
did what he could. Finally, with the AM marks incident, White was able to gain control of the 
process and make a decision that was not in the best interest of the U.S. One must remember that 
for an agent of influence, to attempt to subvert policy makes someone as guilty as succeeding. 
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Here mens rea might apply. Advancing a foreign power’s or any agenda above your own 
government’s shows intent. 
In cases of espionage, caution should used with the reasonable doubt standard. The very 
nature of espionage engenders doubt, deception, misdirection and disinformation. Anyone who 
wants to doubt will have plenty of reasons supplied for him. That aside, with Harry Dexter White 
the preponderance of evidence and his actions establish beyond reasonable doubt his guilt and 
complicity in Soviet espionage activities in the U.S. and attempted policy subversion. 
In the final analysis this is the best verdict for Harry Dexter White, his life, his work and 
his reputation. Experts in the field regard White as a world class economist. Recently, Berkeley 
economist, Brad De-Long, ranked White number one in a list of the top ten people who did the 
most to win the Cold War. His reasoning was that White was the driving force behind the 
Bretton Woods agreement, the IMF and the “greatest generation of economic growth the world 
has ever seen.” He was an economist who saw free trade as the best path to world peace yet he 
insisted on an economic boycott of a known belligerent that resulted in the attack on Pearl Har-
bor. He was a monetary and currency expert who willfully gave away printing plates to an irres-
ponsible government. This caused a serious drain on the U.S. treasury and destabilized the econ-
omic and political situation in postwar Germany. The black market and inflation surprised him. 
His defenders mount elaborate and difficult to defend rationales to wish away the enormous 
amount of evidence of his subversive activities in WWII. If they are correct then White’s policy 
decisions put a lie to his purported genius. Occam’s Razor states that between two conflicting 
explanations choose the simplest one. The simplest explanation is that Harry Dexter White was a 
financial genius who sacrificed his economic principles to the demands of the Soviet dream.119
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